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On the research and 
the writing phase of 
the historian’s work
Hayden White
University of California, Santa Cruz
The difficulty in criticising the whole work of any 
author lies in its historical nature. I would expect 
people to change their views, revise or even re-
write their work over a period of 15 years and I 
myself had a great deal of difficulty with people 
putting all my work together, and treating it as if 
it were all produced within the same very short 
time span. But they do this all the time and then 
act surprised that they find certain contradic-
tions or inconsistencies. To which my response 
is: “Yes, I would hope so.” I would hope that I 
changed (slightly) over all those years. There-
fore, to look for contradictions in a body of work 
spanning 30 or 40 years, especially in fields 
that do not have technical languages, which a 
field like a historical writing certainly does not, 
seems uninteresting to me. 
I believe that historical writing is more profit-
ably approached as associative writing rather 
than as disciplinary writing of a scientific kind in 
which the logical law of non-contradiction con-
trols the evolution of an argument. I believe that 
historical writing, especially in a narrative mode, 
cannot be understood by bringing to it criteria 
of scientific consistency, logical consistency and 
so forth.
So I’m not going to try to look for some contra-
diction or confusion in Chris Lorenz’s writings 
and say that what he said 15 years ago contra-
dicts what he says today, and then ask him to 
straighten things out satisfactorily. I want, rath-
er, to know primarily what Lorenz in his criti-
cal note might want. What does he desire? What 
would he like to see happen? Would he like me 
to say “Oh yes, I got it all wrong, you’re right!” 
I would be perfectly willing to concede that. I 
won’t say you misread me because everybody 
misreads everybody else. No one ever gets even 
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one’s own writing quite right. The common response to every review is: “Oh! You misunderstood 
me! You misread me!” I think only that you read me. And this is the reason why I am not going to 
reply to you. 
My approach to you would not be to characterise, not to sum up, not to paraphrase what you said 
but to quote you. My approach to historical writing is this: not to sum up, not to give the biography 
of the author in order to explain his historiography. Rather look at, look at the historiography itself, 
look at its most superficial aspects, its most manifest aspects, what it says on the page, and do a 
grammatical, dictional and semantic analysis of what is said, not what you find logically implied 
by it or what was logically presupposed by it. In fields like historiography, which are not scientific 
in any strict sense of the term, one needs a critical principle somewhat different from that obtain-
ing in real sciences – by which I mean disciplines with experimental controls over their subjects. 
Typically, philosophers above all say, “Oh, what Wittgenstein meant to say was this” and then they 
criticise their paraphrase or condensed version of what Wittgenstein meant to say. I believe this is 
what Lorenz does consistently. He does not take a patch of text written by a historian and analyse 
it. Rather, he asks: what’s going on here? What he does, he does very well. His critical work is a 
tissue of citation, quotation, paraphrase and so forth of other people’s work. Often, he falls back on 
someone else’s paraphrase of their work and criticises it on the basis of that kind of paraphrase. 
I’m just saying, as Wittgenstein would say: back to the rough ground, you know, let’s have some 
texts, back to the texts, let’s look at the text. What does a given historian really say. Not what did 
he mean to say. Not what did he want to do. Let’s look at what he wrote. Let’s use that as the ba-
sis. I think Lorenz fails to do that (for example, he criticised a historian for failing to provide causal 
explanation for the rise of Nazism, even though this historian explicitly indicated he was not trying 
to establish a scientifically responsible explanation of the phenomenon).
On the other hand, he knows what he wants, I think. Or does he know what he wants? What? Do 
you, Chris, desire anything intellectually? Is there something you would like to see? Or see happen? 
What is your utopia? I’d like to know that, you see? What would you like people to do? You might 
say, “We should be more scientific” and we should understand science as I understand it and want 
it to be. I’ll accept that. I’ll accept it. This should lead me therefore to change what I do, right? That 
is, if I’m sincere and if this is an ideal conversational situation among philosophers. 
Philosophers find it difficult to admit that another philosopher has got them right. And they find it 
difficult to change, no matter what kind of criticism is brought against them. They tend to be what 
psychoanalysts call “anal-retentive”. As far as I know, the only philosophical system that was ever 
definitively criticised and determined by general consensus to be completely wrong was that of 
Herbert Spencer in the 19th century. His whole system – everyone agreed – was completely mis-
taken and by the end of the century no one would quote him. Now Lorenz says “philosophy of his-
tory has in the recent past drifted away from philosophy of science and social science in the direc-
tion of philosophy of art, literature, rhetoric and aesthetics”.1 I take that to be a negative judgment. It 
is a mistake, right? Which was made by philosophers of history? Well, obviously, me  –  and a few 
others. (Ankersmit? Not many others.) But has not philosophy itself moved away from “philoso-
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phy of science and the social sciences” as well? Does one lament this move? Why? What is lost? 
What is threatened? It is only “philosophy of history”.
The other thing he says is that everybody who is interested in historians’ narratives wants to dis-
tinguish between the research phase and the writing phase of the historian’s operations, right? 
He has said it again and again for many decades now. White (in Metahistory) ignores the whole re-
search dimension of historical writing. And this means, I take it, that having ignored the research 
phase of historians’ activities, what I have to say about historical writing or, more precisely, writing 
by historians cannot be taken seriously. Well, that is alright with me. If anyone thinks that you can-
not say anything worthwhile about the writing of historians or the genre of historical writing without 
rewriting the history of historical research, they are certainly welcome to that view. Even in Meta-
history, however, I dealt with historians’ and philosophers of history’s views on historical causation.
I took it for granted that everybody already knows about the research phase of different historians’ 
activities. My problem was: how do historians or anyone else concerned with the past get from 
the research phase to the writing up of what they discovered in the research phase. That was the 
problem that no one I had ever read, writing about historiography and historical writing, had ever 
addressed. What is involved in the “turn” from the “research phase” to the writing phase? None of 
my graduate students knew how to do it either. They were in archives for years, taking notes, or-
ganising their notes, writing a chapter, throwing it out, revising it, giving it to the professors (who 
usually said, no, it is too long, or no, it is too short, or more information, more data, shorter para-
graphs, etc, etc, go back, do more work). How do you get to the point where you could say “Oh, now 
I know what I want to say, and I’ll start writing?” 
That’s a very interesting theoretical – as well as a practical – problem. How do you move from the 
research phase to the writing up of the research and what changes can occur between the assem-
bly of the research notes and the writing of a chapter in a history. Because important changes do 
occur. I’ve seen it myself; I end the research phase with a big stack of notes, then I write some-
thing up: and gradually I throw this out. I throw that out and try to arrange it in different ways and 
try to write about it. 
But number three: you don’t know what you’re going to write until you start writing – and it is the 
writing (of historians) that I’m talking about. I am not talking about fiction-writing, but about histor-
ical writing as a species of the general category of an activity – writing – which is itself a process 
of discovery. Writing. What you do when you try to write up your research notes is to find out what 
you have found in the research. So there’s no way of separating the research from the writing after 
the research has been finished. It’s a process of composition from the beginning; the selection of 
the materials, organising them, and writing about them are all phases of the compositional activ-
ity. And since it is writing that we are concerned with in any discussion of historiography, I thought 
we needed something like a theory of writing, or theory of literary writing, in order to look at those 
historians whose work had been presented in a narrative mode. I didn’t try to generalise about 
historians who write technical articles on (discreet) research topics. I was talking about narrative 
writing in the period in which the narrative was the dominant mode of reporting one’s research. 
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Now, we often will disagree on the different practices of historians. And historians who are doing 
the daily work of historians may very well have no interest in the kind of thoughts that Ankersmit 
or White might set forth about narrative. They may very well feel that it is the research that counts, 
not the mode or manner of presentation. But permit me to stress that we have been writing about 
the writing of historians, not their research techniques – on which, by the way, there is very little 
disagreement nowadays. And we grant them that. Historians know what they’re doing in their re-
search. What they often don’t know is what they’re doing in their writing, in their writing after their 
research. And that often is not a matter of aesthetics; it’s a matter of creativity or failure of imagina-
tion. It has to do with the imagination, just as research has to do with going through the materials 
in order to construct an object in imagination that would be a possible object of scientific enquiry. 
The object has to be constructed as a possible object of scientific enquiry before you can bring the 
analytical tools to bear upon it. 
So I wasn’t trying to deconstruct historical writing. I was trying to write a history of historical writing, 
not a history of historical research, not a history of the philosophy of history. I said, no one has ever 
tried to write a history of historical writing that took historians’ writings as the primary sources. 
So, for me what the historians wrote was the primary sources. Not what they thought they would 
like to have written, not their lives, not their formal statements. What they said. And I brought to 
my consideration of this question linguistics and literary techniques of analysis in order to show 
how they put things together in and by writing. In an associative mode, the one thing that a narra-
tive is not is a set of logical arguments. They had arguments, didn’t they? Of course, historians of-
fer arguments but in addition to the argument by narrativisation which constitutes the substance 
of the content of the story they tell. But the totality, in which the narrative and the argument are 
fused, is dissociative. I mean that it’s held together by commonsense notions of similarity, conti-
guity, synecdoche, things of that sort. A history is an extended discourse. It’s not just a sequence 
of declarative sentences. 
Finally, Lorenz says, and I quote; I do not paraphrase, I quote: “A scientific historical explanation 
must contain one empirical causal law.” I would like him to give us just one example of what he 
means here? Give me an example of an empirical causal law of history – a law like the law of 
gravity, the law of attraction at a distance of different masses. Give me one empirical causal law 
that historians or philosophers of history have been able to identify – and use for predictive or ex-
planatory purposes. 
NOTE
1   Chris Lorenz, “Can histories be true? Narrativism, positivism, and the ‘metaphorical turn’”, History and 
Theory 37/3 (1998): 309–329, here 310.
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